回憶錄16
從務實滑向務虛
外交部從它的前身清朝的總理事務衙門1861成立以來，到今天已經一百六十年。這期間幾乎都是在「艱苦奮戰」。
1971退出聯合國，中華民國的席位被中共取代。我國被迫開始推動「務實外交」。當時在蔣經國主政下的「務實外交」，重點在「促進與世界各國在經貿文化等方面的合作」。 1979年美國和我國斷交，承認中共。我國外交更加困難。從1990年代開始大約有十幾年光景，駐外同仁的工作有相當比重投入了「從返聯合國」的「戰略目標」。隨著兩岸實力的此消彼長，以及對岸「大國崛起」國際現實，這個「戰略目標」進行的結果，是可以預期的：身撞牆壁，心生苦悶。
外交難以突破。於是許多館處的年度績效考核，慢慢轉向「和駐在國簽了多少協議，發了多少電報，公文」等等可以「量化」的數字統計。外交部似乎也難以避免地認同了這個趨勢。官僚體制之下， 很自然產生了「上有政策，下有對策」的文化現象。
我在馬拉威兩年，在X大使的積極運作下，我國和馬拉威簽訂了中華民國與「馬拉威航空合作協定」，「避免雙重課稅協定」，和「司法互助協定」，三個協議。簽訂這些協議，其實不困難。我國是馬拉威主要援助國之一，我們提出的合作案，馬方都是高度配合。每次我方把協議草約送達馬國政府，很快就獲得馬方同意。每次簽完協議，大使都相當欣喜。大功一件，先電報呈報，再以外交郵袋呈報約本正本。
這些協議，其實功效只是「形式」上的心裡安慰。我國與馬拉威沒有航線連接，何需航空協定？沒有直接投資，何來雙重避稅？沒有國人會到馬拉威躲避司法制裁，何需司法互助，相互引渡？
維繫了四十二年的邦交，最終還是走到終點。2008年1月15日馬拉威變心了，承認中共。上面提到的三個協議，從生效到終止，最終證明只是擺設。
圖片說明：po 文日期2021.06.28
1大使代表政府與馬方簽訂協議
2 握手完成協議
3 徒然，還是斐然？
Memories 16
Slide from practical to practical
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one hundred and sixty years since its predecessor, the General Director of the Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861. Almost all this time is "hard struggle".
Withdrawing from the UN in 1971, Republic of China was replaced by the Chinese Communist Party. Our country was forced to start pushing for "practical diplomacy". At that time, the "practical diplomacy" under the Chiang Ching-kuo administration focused on "promoting cooperation with countries around the world in economic, trade and culture In 1979, the United States broke diplomatic relations with our country and recognized the CCP. Our diplomacy is more difficult. Since the 1990s, about a decade or so, a considerable proportion of the work of my colleagues abroad has been devoted to the "strategic goal" of returning to the United Nations. With the power of the two sides of the strait, and the international reality of the "rise of great powers" on the other side, the result of this "strategic goal" is to be expected: hitting the wall and suffering.
Diplomacy is difficult to break through. As a result, the annual performance assessment of many offices slowly turned to "how many agreements have been signed with the host country, how many telegrams, official documents" and so on can be "quantified". The Foreign Ministry also seems to be inescapable to agree with this trend. Under the bureaucratic system, the cultural phenomenon of "there are policies, there are counsels" naturally occurs.
During my two years in Malawi, under the active operation of Ambassador X, my country and Malawi signed Republic of China three agreements with Malaysia Airlines Cooperation Agreement, “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement”, and “Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement”. Signing these agreements is not really difficult. Our country is one of Malawi's major donors, and the Malaysian side is highly cooperative in the case of cooperation we have proposed. Every time we send the draft agreement to the Malaysian government, we get the consent of the Malaysian side very quickly. The ambassador is quite happy every time the agreement is signed. A great achievement, first telegraph, then send the original contract in diplomatic pouch.
The effect of these agreements is in fact only "form" comfort in the heart. We have no route connection to Malawi, why do we need an air agreement? Without direct investment, why double tax avoidance? No national will go to Malawi to avoid judicial sanctions, why do we need mutual legal assistance and mutual extradition?
42 years of diplomatic relations, and finally came to an end. 15 January 2008 Malawi changed heart and recognized the CCP. The three agreements mentioned above, from entry into force to termination, ultimately proved to be just a set.
Photo caption: post date 2021.06.28
1 Ambassador sign agreement with Malaysia on behalf of the government
2 Handshake to complete the agreement
3 In vain or in vain?
從務實滑向務虛
外交部從它的前身清朝的總理事務衙門1861成立以來，到今天已經一百六十年。這期間幾乎都是在「艱苦奮戰」。
1971退出聯合國，中華民國的席位被中共取代。我國被迫開始推動「務實外交」。當時在蔣經國主政下的「務實外交」，重點在「促進與世界各國在經貿文化等方面的合作」。 1979年美國和我國斷交，承認中共。我國外交更加困難。從1990年代開始大約有十幾年光景，駐外同仁的工作有相當比重投入了「從返聯合國」的「戰略目標」。隨著兩岸實力的此消彼長，以及對岸「大國崛起」國際現實，這個「戰略目標」進行的結果，是可以預期的：身撞牆壁，心生苦悶。
外交難以突破。於是許多館處的年度績效考核，慢慢轉向「和駐在國簽了多少協議，發了多少電報，公文」等等可以「量化」的數字統計。外交部似乎也難以避免地認同了這個趨勢。官僚體制之下， 很自然產生了「上有政策，下有對策」的文化現象。
我在馬拉威兩年，在X大使的積極運作下，我國和馬拉威簽訂了中華民國與「馬拉威航空合作協定」，「避免雙重課稅協定」，和「司法互助協定」，三個協議。簽訂這些協議，其實不困難。我國是馬拉威主要援助國之一，我們提出的合作案，馬方都是高度配合。每次我方把協議草約送達馬國政府，很快就獲得馬方同意。每次簽完協議，大使都相當欣喜。大功一件，先電報呈報，再以外交郵袋呈報約本正本。
這些協議，其實功效只是「形式」上的心裡安慰。我國與馬拉威沒有航線連接，何需航空協定？沒有直接投資，何來雙重避稅？沒有國人會到馬拉威躲避司法制裁，何需司法互助，相互引渡？
維繫了四十二年的邦交，最終還是走到終點。2008年1月15日馬拉威變心了，承認中共。上面提到的三個協議，從生效到終止，最終證明只是擺設。
圖片說明：po 文日期2021.06.28
1大使代表政府與馬方簽訂協議
2 握手完成協議
3 徒然，還是斐然？
Memories 16
Slide from practical to practical
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one hundred and sixty years since its predecessor, the General Director of the Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861. Almost all this time is "hard struggle".
Withdrawing from the UN in 1971, Republic of China was replaced by the Chinese Communist Party. Our country was forced to start pushing for "practical diplomacy". At that time, the "practical diplomacy" under the Chiang Ching-kuo administration focused on "promoting cooperation with countries around the world in economic, trade and culture In 1979, the United States broke diplomatic relations with our country and recognized the CCP. Our diplomacy is more difficult. Since the 1990s, about a decade or so, a considerable proportion of the work of my colleagues abroad has been devoted to the "strategic goal" of returning to the United Nations. With the power of the two sides of the strait, and the international reality of the "rise of great powers" on the other side, the result of this "strategic goal" is to be expected: hitting the wall and suffering.
Diplomacy is difficult to break through. As a result, the annual performance assessment of many offices slowly turned to "how many agreements have been signed with the host country, how many telegrams, official documents" and so on can be "quantified". The Foreign Ministry also seems to be inescapable to agree with this trend. Under the bureaucratic system, the cultural phenomenon of "there are policies, there are counsels" naturally occurs.
During my two years in Malawi, under the active operation of Ambassador X, my country and Malawi signed Republic of China three agreements with Malaysia Airlines Cooperation Agreement, “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement”, and “Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement”. Signing these agreements is not really difficult. Our country is one of Malawi's major donors, and the Malaysian side is highly cooperative in the case of cooperation we have proposed. Every time we send the draft agreement to the Malaysian government, we get the consent of the Malaysian side very quickly. The ambassador is quite happy every time the agreement is signed. A great achievement, first telegraph, then send the original contract in diplomatic pouch.
The effect of these agreements is in fact only "form" comfort in the heart. We have no route connection to Malawi, why do we need an air agreement? Without direct investment, why double tax avoidance? No national will go to Malawi to avoid judicial sanctions, why do we need mutual legal assistance and mutual extradition?
42 years of diplomatic relations, and finally came to an end. 15 January 2008 Malawi changed heart and recognized the CCP. The three agreements mentioned above, from entry into force to termination, ultimately proved to be just a set.
Photo caption: post date 2021.06.28
1 Ambassador sign agreement with Malaysia on behalf of the government
2 Handshake to complete the agreement
3 In vain or in vain?
Images 1 of 3
回憶錄16
從務實滑向務虛
外交部從它的前身清朝的總理事務衙門1861成立以來，到今天已經一百六十年。這期間幾乎都是在「艱苦奮戰」。
1971退出聯合國，中華民國的席位被中共取代。我國被迫開始推動「務實外交」。當時在蔣經國主政下的「務實外交」，重點在「促進與世界各國在經貿文化等方面的合作」。 1979年美國和我國斷交，承認中共。我國外交更加困難。從1990年代開始大約有十幾年光景，駐外同仁的工作有相當比重投入了「從返聯合國」的「戰略目標」。隨著兩岸實力的此消彼長，以及對岸「大國崛起」國際現實，這個「戰略目標」進行的結果，是可以預期的：身撞牆壁，心生苦悶。
外交難以突破。於是許多館處的年度績效考核，慢慢轉向「和駐在國簽了多少協議，發了多少電報，公文」等等可以「量化」的數字統計。外交部似乎也難以避免地認同了這個趨勢。官僚體制之下， 很自然產生了「上有政策，下有對策」的文化現象。
我在馬拉威兩年，在X大使的積極運作下，我國和馬拉威簽訂了中華民國與「馬拉威航空合作協定」，「避免雙重課稅協定」，和「司法互助協定」，三個協議。簽訂這些協議，其實不困難。我國是馬拉威主要援助國之一，我們提出的合作案，馬方都是高度配合。每次我方把協議草約送達馬國政府，很快就獲得馬方同意。每次簽完協議，大使都相當欣喜。大功一件，先電報呈報，再以外交郵袋呈報約本正本。
這些協議，其實功效只是「形式」上的心裡安慰。我國與馬拉威沒有航線連接，何需航空協定？沒有直接投資，何來雙重避稅？沒有國人會到馬拉威躲避司法制裁，何需司法互助，相互引渡？
維繫了四十二年的邦交，最終還是走到終點。2008年1月15日馬拉威變心了，承認中共。上面提到的三個協議，從生效到終止，最終證明只是擺設。
圖片說明：po 文日期2021.06.28
1大使代表政府與馬方簽訂協議
2 握手完成協議
3 徒然，還是斐然？
Memories 16
Slide from practical to practical
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one hundred and sixty years since its predecessor, the General Director of the Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861. Almost all this time is "hard struggle".
Withdrawing from the UN in 1971, Republic of China was replaced by the Chinese Communist Party. Our country was forced to start pushing for "practical diplomacy". At that time, the "practical diplomacy" under the Chiang Ching-kuo administration focused on "promoting cooperation with countries around the world in economic, trade and culture In 1979, the United States broke diplomatic relations with our country and recognized the CCP. Our diplomacy is more difficult. Since the 1990s, about a decade or so, a considerable proportion of the work of my colleagues abroad has been devoted to the "strategic goal" of returning to the United Nations. With the power of the two sides of the strait, and the international reality of the "rise of great powers" on the other side, the result of this "strategic goal" is to be expected: hitting the wall and suffering.
Diplomacy is difficult to break through. As a result, the annual performance assessment of many offices slowly turned to "how many agreements have been signed with the host country, how many telegrams, official documents" and so on can be "quantified". The Foreign Ministry also seems to be inescapable to agree with this trend. Under the bureaucratic system, the cultural phenomenon of "there are policies, there are counsels" naturally occurs.
During my two years in Malawi, under the active operation of Ambassador X, my country and Malawi signed Republic of China three agreements with Malaysia Airlines Cooperation Agreement, “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement”, and “Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement”. Signing these agreements is not really difficult. Our country is one of Malawi's major donors, and the Malaysian side is highly cooperative in the case of cooperation we have proposed. Every time we send the draft agreement to the Malaysian government, we get the consent of the Malaysian side very quickly. The ambassador is quite happy every time the agreement is signed. A great achievement, first telegraph, then send the original contract in diplomatic pouch.
The effect of these agreements is in fact only "form" comfort in the heart. We have no route connection to Malawi, why do we need an air agreement? Without direct investment, why double tax avoidance? No national will go to Malawi to avoid judicial sanctions, why do we need mutual legal assistance and mutual extradition?
42 years of diplomatic relations, and finally came to an end. 15 January 2008 Malawi changed heart and recognized the CCP. The three agreements mentioned above, from entry into force to termination, ultimately proved to be just a set.
Photo caption: post date 2021.06.28
1 Ambassador sign agreement with Malaysia on behalf of the government
2 Handshake to complete the agreement
3 In vain or in vain?
從務實滑向務虛
外交部從它的前身清朝的總理事務衙門1861成立以來，到今天已經一百六十年。這期間幾乎都是在「艱苦奮戰」。
1971退出聯合國，中華民國的席位被中共取代。我國被迫開始推動「務實外交」。當時在蔣經國主政下的「務實外交」，重點在「促進與世界各國在經貿文化等方面的合作」。 1979年美國和我國斷交，承認中共。我國外交更加困難。從1990年代開始大約有十幾年光景，駐外同仁的工作有相當比重投入了「從返聯合國」的「戰略目標」。隨著兩岸實力的此消彼長，以及對岸「大國崛起」國際現實，這個「戰略目標」進行的結果，是可以預期的：身撞牆壁，心生苦悶。
外交難以突破。於是許多館處的年度績效考核，慢慢轉向「和駐在國簽了多少協議，發了多少電報，公文」等等可以「量化」的數字統計。外交部似乎也難以避免地認同了這個趨勢。官僚體制之下， 很自然產生了「上有政策，下有對策」的文化現象。
我在馬拉威兩年，在X大使的積極運作下，我國和馬拉威簽訂了中華民國與「馬拉威航空合作協定」，「避免雙重課稅協定」，和「司法互助協定」，三個協議。簽訂這些協議，其實不困難。我國是馬拉威主要援助國之一，我們提出的合作案，馬方都是高度配合。每次我方把協議草約送達馬國政府，很快就獲得馬方同意。每次簽完協議，大使都相當欣喜。大功一件，先電報呈報，再以外交郵袋呈報約本正本。
這些協議，其實功效只是「形式」上的心裡安慰。我國與馬拉威沒有航線連接，何需航空協定？沒有直接投資，何來雙重避稅？沒有國人會到馬拉威躲避司法制裁，何需司法互助，相互引渡？
維繫了四十二年的邦交，最終還是走到終點。2008年1月15日馬拉威變心了，承認中共。上面提到的三個協議，從生效到終止，最終證明只是擺設。
圖片說明：po 文日期2021.06.28
1大使代表政府與馬方簽訂協議
2 握手完成協議
3 徒然，還是斐然？
Memories 16
Slide from practical to practical
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one hundred and sixty years since its predecessor, the General Director of the Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861. Almost all this time is "hard struggle".
Withdrawing from the UN in 1971, Republic of China was replaced by the Chinese Communist Party. Our country was forced to start pushing for "practical diplomacy". At that time, the "practical diplomacy" under the Chiang Ching-kuo administration focused on "promoting cooperation with countries around the world in economic, trade and culture In 1979, the United States broke diplomatic relations with our country and recognized the CCP. Our diplomacy is more difficult. Since the 1990s, about a decade or so, a considerable proportion of the work of my colleagues abroad has been devoted to the "strategic goal" of returning to the United Nations. With the power of the two sides of the strait, and the international reality of the "rise of great powers" on the other side, the result of this "strategic goal" is to be expected: hitting the wall and suffering.
Diplomacy is difficult to break through. As a result, the annual performance assessment of many offices slowly turned to "how many agreements have been signed with the host country, how many telegrams, official documents" and so on can be "quantified". The Foreign Ministry also seems to be inescapable to agree with this trend. Under the bureaucratic system, the cultural phenomenon of "there are policies, there are counsels" naturally occurs.
During my two years in Malawi, under the active operation of Ambassador X, my country and Malawi signed Republic of China three agreements with Malaysia Airlines Cooperation Agreement, “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement”, and “Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement”. Signing these agreements is not really difficult. Our country is one of Malawi's major donors, and the Malaysian side is highly cooperative in the case of cooperation we have proposed. Every time we send the draft agreement to the Malaysian government, we get the consent of the Malaysian side very quickly. The ambassador is quite happy every time the agreement is signed. A great achievement, first telegraph, then send the original contract in diplomatic pouch.
The effect of these agreements is in fact only "form" comfort in the heart. We have no route connection to Malawi, why do we need an air agreement? Without direct investment, why double tax avoidance? No national will go to Malawi to avoid judicial sanctions, why do we need mutual legal assistance and mutual extradition?
42 years of diplomatic relations, and finally came to an end. 15 January 2008 Malawi changed heart and recognized the CCP. The three agreements mentioned above, from entry into force to termination, ultimately proved to be just a set.
Photo caption: post date 2021.06.28
1 Ambassador sign agreement with Malaysia on behalf of the government
2 Handshake to complete the agreement
3 In vain or in vain?
Images 2 of 3
回憶錄16
從務實滑向務虛
外交部從它的前身清朝的總理事務衙門1861成立以來，到今天已經一百六十年。這期間幾乎都是在「艱苦奮戰」。
1971退出聯合國，中華民國的席位被中共取代。我國被迫開始推動「務實外交」。當時在蔣經國主政下的「務實外交」，重點在「促進與世界各國在經貿文化等方面的合作」。 1979年美國和我國斷交，承認中共。我國外交更加困難。從1990年代開始大約有十幾年光景，駐外同仁的工作有相當比重投入了「從返聯合國」的「戰略目標」。隨著兩岸實力的此消彼長，以及對岸「大國崛起」國際現實，這個「戰略目標」進行的結果，是可以預期的：身撞牆壁，心生苦悶。
外交難以突破。於是許多館處的年度績效考核，慢慢轉向「和駐在國簽了多少協議，發了多少電報，公文」等等可以「量化」的數字統計。外交部似乎也難以避免地認同了這個趨勢。官僚體制之下， 很自然產生了「上有政策，下有對策」的文化現象。
我在馬拉威兩年，在X大使的積極運作下，我國和馬拉威簽訂了中華民國與「馬拉威航空合作協定」，「避免雙重課稅協定」，和「司法互助協定」，三個協議。簽訂這些協議，其實不困難。我國是馬拉威主要援助國之一，我們提出的合作案，馬方都是高度配合。每次我方把協議草約送達馬國政府，很快就獲得馬方同意。每次簽完協議，大使都相當欣喜。大功一件，先電報呈報，再以外交郵袋呈報約本正本。
這些協議，其實功效只是「形式」上的心裡安慰。我國與馬拉威沒有航線連接，何需航空協定？沒有直接投資，何來雙重避稅？沒有國人會到馬拉威躲避司法制裁，何需司法互助，相互引渡？
維繫了四十二年的邦交，最終還是走到終點。2008年1月15日馬拉威變心了，承認中共。上面提到的三個協議，從生效到終止，最終證明只是擺設。
圖片說明：po 文日期2021.06.28
1大使代表政府與馬方簽訂協議
2 握手完成協議
3 徒然，還是斐然？
Memories 16
Slide from practical to practical
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one hundred and sixty years since its predecessor, the General Director of the Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861. Almost all this time is "hard struggle".
Withdrawing from the UN in 1971, Republic of China was replaced by the Chinese Communist Party. Our country was forced to start pushing for "practical diplomacy". At that time, the "practical diplomacy" under the Chiang Ching-kuo administration focused on "promoting cooperation with countries around the world in economic, trade and culture In 1979, the United States broke diplomatic relations with our country and recognized the CCP. Our diplomacy is more difficult. Since the 1990s, about a decade or so, a considerable proportion of the work of my colleagues abroad has been devoted to the "strategic goal" of returning to the United Nations. With the power of the two sides of the strait, and the international reality of the "rise of great powers" on the other side, the result of this "strategic goal" is to be expected: hitting the wall and suffering.
Diplomacy is difficult to break through. As a result, the annual performance assessment of many offices slowly turned to "how many agreements have been signed with the host country, how many telegrams, official documents" and so on can be "quantified". The Foreign Ministry also seems to be inescapable to agree with this trend. Under the bureaucratic system, the cultural phenomenon of "there are policies, there are counsels" naturally occurs.
During my two years in Malawi, under the active operation of Ambassador X, my country and Malawi signed Republic of China three agreements with Malaysia Airlines Cooperation Agreement, “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement”, and “Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement”. Signing these agreements is not really difficult. Our country is one of Malawi's major donors, and the Malaysian side is highly cooperative in the case of cooperation we have proposed. Every time we send the draft agreement to the Malaysian government, we get the consent of the Malaysian side very quickly. The ambassador is quite happy every time the agreement is signed. A great achievement, first telegraph, then send the original contract in diplomatic pouch.
The effect of these agreements is in fact only "form" comfort in the heart. We have no route connection to Malawi, why do we need an air agreement? Without direct investment, why double tax avoidance? No national will go to Malawi to avoid judicial sanctions, why do we need mutual legal assistance and mutual extradition?
42 years of diplomatic relations, and finally came to an end. 15 January 2008 Malawi changed heart and recognized the CCP. The three agreements mentioned above, from entry into force to termination, ultimately proved to be just a set.
Photo caption: post date 2021.06.28
1 Ambassador sign agreement with Malaysia on behalf of the government
2 Handshake to complete the agreement
3 In vain or in vain?
從務實滑向務虛
外交部從它的前身清朝的總理事務衙門1861成立以來，到今天已經一百六十年。這期間幾乎都是在「艱苦奮戰」。
1971退出聯合國，中華民國的席位被中共取代。我國被迫開始推動「務實外交」。當時在蔣經國主政下的「務實外交」，重點在「促進與世界各國在經貿文化等方面的合作」。 1979年美國和我國斷交，承認中共。我國外交更加困難。從1990年代開始大約有十幾年光景，駐外同仁的工作有相當比重投入了「從返聯合國」的「戰略目標」。隨著兩岸實力的此消彼長，以及對岸「大國崛起」國際現實，這個「戰略目標」進行的結果，是可以預期的：身撞牆壁，心生苦悶。
外交難以突破。於是許多館處的年度績效考核，慢慢轉向「和駐在國簽了多少協議，發了多少電報，公文」等等可以「量化」的數字統計。外交部似乎也難以避免地認同了這個趨勢。官僚體制之下， 很自然產生了「上有政策，下有對策」的文化現象。
我在馬拉威兩年，在X大使的積極運作下，我國和馬拉威簽訂了中華民國與「馬拉威航空合作協定」，「避免雙重課稅協定」，和「司法互助協定」，三個協議。簽訂這些協議，其實不困難。我國是馬拉威主要援助國之一，我們提出的合作案，馬方都是高度配合。每次我方把協議草約送達馬國政府，很快就獲得馬方同意。每次簽完協議，大使都相當欣喜。大功一件，先電報呈報，再以外交郵袋呈報約本正本。
這些協議，其實功效只是「形式」上的心裡安慰。我國與馬拉威沒有航線連接，何需航空協定？沒有直接投資，何來雙重避稅？沒有國人會到馬拉威躲避司法制裁，何需司法互助，相互引渡？
維繫了四十二年的邦交，最終還是走到終點。2008年1月15日馬拉威變心了，承認中共。上面提到的三個協議，從生效到終止，最終證明只是擺設。
圖片說明：po 文日期2021.06.28
1大使代表政府與馬方簽訂協議
2 握手完成協議
3 徒然，還是斐然？
Memories 16
Slide from practical to practical
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one hundred and sixty years since its predecessor, the General Director of the Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861. Almost all this time is "hard struggle".
Withdrawing from the UN in 1971, Republic of China was replaced by the Chinese Communist Party. Our country was forced to start pushing for "practical diplomacy". At that time, the "practical diplomacy" under the Chiang Ching-kuo administration focused on "promoting cooperation with countries around the world in economic, trade and culture In 1979, the United States broke diplomatic relations with our country and recognized the CCP. Our diplomacy is more difficult. Since the 1990s, about a decade or so, a considerable proportion of the work of my colleagues abroad has been devoted to the "strategic goal" of returning to the United Nations. With the power of the two sides of the strait, and the international reality of the "rise of great powers" on the other side, the result of this "strategic goal" is to be expected: hitting the wall and suffering.
Diplomacy is difficult to break through. As a result, the annual performance assessment of many offices slowly turned to "how many agreements have been signed with the host country, how many telegrams, official documents" and so on can be "quantified". The Foreign Ministry also seems to be inescapable to agree with this trend. Under the bureaucratic system, the cultural phenomenon of "there are policies, there are counsels" naturally occurs.
During my two years in Malawi, under the active operation of Ambassador X, my country and Malawi signed Republic of China three agreements with Malaysia Airlines Cooperation Agreement, “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement”, and “Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement”. Signing these agreements is not really difficult. Our country is one of Malawi's major donors, and the Malaysian side is highly cooperative in the case of cooperation we have proposed. Every time we send the draft agreement to the Malaysian government, we get the consent of the Malaysian side very quickly. The ambassador is quite happy every time the agreement is signed. A great achievement, first telegraph, then send the original contract in diplomatic pouch.
The effect of these agreements is in fact only "form" comfort in the heart. We have no route connection to Malawi, why do we need an air agreement? Without direct investment, why double tax avoidance? No national will go to Malawi to avoid judicial sanctions, why do we need mutual legal assistance and mutual extradition?
42 years of diplomatic relations, and finally came to an end. 15 January 2008 Malawi changed heart and recognized the CCP. The three agreements mentioned above, from entry into force to termination, ultimately proved to be just a set.
Photo caption: post date 2021.06.28
1 Ambassador sign agreement with Malaysia on behalf of the government
2 Handshake to complete the agreement
3 In vain or in vain?
Images 3 of 3
256 bit SSL Encryption